Mexico, chief casualty of America's 'war on drugs'

With the death toll ever rising, it's high time the US stopped sponsoring a bloody, unwinnable conflict with the drugs cartels.
Mexican police guard a US embassy vehicle after it came under fire from gunmen on Highway 57 between Mexico City and Monterrey, on 15 February 2011. A US immigration and customs enforcement agent was killed and another wounded in the attack. Photograph: AP Photo/Teodoro Blanco Vazquez

John Ackerman

Tuesday's brutal attack on two US law enforcement agents in Mexico has led to the normal sabre-rattling. Representative Michael McCaul of Texas has called it a "game-changer" and a "wake-up call" to the "war on our nation's doorstep". Last week, James Westphal, undersecretary of the Army, had already spoken of an "armed insurgency" in Mexico, and the possibility of sending "armed and fighting" troops across the border to prevent a "takeover of government". Secretary Janet Napolitano continually speaks of the "war" south of the border. James Clapper, national intelligence director, recently announced that Mexico has been promoted to being a top national security threat.

Mexico has, indeed, reached a tipping point. But an escalation of the present military strategy will only make the situation worse. The best response to recent events is to end the war and proceed towards disarmament, instead of aggravating the conflict. Gil Kerlikowske, director of the Office of National Drug Control Policy, has declared the end of the metaphorical "war on drugs" within US borders. The time has come also to bring a stop to the very real war on the drug cartels south of the border.

The central problem with the military strategy is that it does not distinguish between violent and non-violent criminals, or serious and less harmful crimes. As Kerlikowske has pointed out, the Mexican cartels are not "insurgents" or "terrorists", but "multivalent criminal organisations", which have diversified into a wide variety of activities including kidnapping, extortion, piracy, human trafficking, money-laundering and government corruption, as well as the transportation and sale of illegal drugs.

Of all of these crimes, by far the least harmful for social and economic development is the transportation of drugs. Although drug consumption is clearly damaging, simply transporting illegal substances does not, in itself, create violence, economic crisis or human suffering. And even the harm of drug consumption pales in comparison to the effects of kidnappings, beheadings and human trafficking, especially when the consumption involves marijuana, sales of which make up two thirds of the profits of the Mexican cartels.

Nevertheless, due to pressure from the US government, the Mexican authorities have been forced to concentrate their scarce law enforcement resources on pursuing the least harmful crimes. This strategy has had the obvious consequence of pushing the criminals towards more dangerous and violent activities. The result: a stratospheric increase in violence, with over 35,000 assassinations in the past four years, 15,000 during 2010 alone. The problem in Mexico is, therefore, not a lack of firepower or support for the "war on drugs", but the very strategy of "war" itself.

The real priority should be on punishing violent crimes, not the transportation of drugs. By turning the typical strategy on its head, Mexico would slowly start to separate the violent, dangerous criminals from those drug traffickers who are in the business principally for the money. Although this might not bring down the prices of illegal drugs on the streets of US cities, it would help end the violence, which today is paramount and may at some point spill over to the US.

This proposal should not be confused with either legalisation or negotiation approaches. Increased liberalisation of marijuana consumption would reduce the urgency of controlling transportation routes, but this strategy is by no means dependent on the legalisation of drug use. And this idea in no way implies a pact with the cartels, in the style of the past authoritarian Mexican governments. On the contrary, the proposal is to increase, not reduce, the pressure on the most serious criminals.

Such a change in strategy would immediately receive vigorous applause from the Mexican people. A growing number of Mexicans have come to the conclusion that peace and prosperity are more important than stopping the flow of drugs towards eager consumers in the United States. A broad new citizen movement has even emerged, rallying around the cry of: "No more blood!" Movement leaders agree that the drug cartels need to be controlled – but in a way that does not destroy the very fabric of society. It makes no sense to win the war, if it leaves the country in shambles.

It is time for the Obama administration to listen to the Mexican people and not only to his military advisers. The roots of the problem obviously lie in the lack of regulation of the sale of assault weapons and in the high drug consumption in the US: 90% of weapons confiscated from Mexican cartels come from the US. But if it is not politically feasible to attend to these issues, the Obama administration can at least change the emphasis of its policy towards Mexico. The central objective should be the reduction of violence and the establishment of the rule of law. Without this, everything else is doomed to fail.